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Abstract 
The Urban Informal Sector (UIS) is a major and expanding part of developing economies 
both in terms of employment and output. However, they cause substantial environmental 
damages and worsen living conditions, prompting authorities to impose rigid environmental 
regulations. Yet, these steps have been mostly arbitrary and based on adhoc popular 
sentiment or political exigencies and not on rigorous econometric analysis. Positive gains 
from the UIS in terms of employment, supply of cheap commodities, and recycling wastes 
have to be carefully weighed before delegating them to the city-fringes or closing them down. 
In this paper, we try to model the reactions of the firms faced with a regulation regime and 
the consequent impact on both individual firms and social welfare to arrive at certain 
parametric guidelines regarding appropriateness of various polices. It emerges that policy 
regulations should follow empirical estimation of the parameters and not be based on 
normative generalisation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Urban Informal Sector (UIS) is a major part of national economies, especially in the developing 
countries, at present. Coming to limelight in 1971, it has not only survived, but has expanded both in 
terms of employment and share in national output in these countries, thereby falsifying the claim that 
it was a transitory phenomenon. Though various types of services in the urban areas are the main 
arenas of informal activities, a major part of UIS is engaged in manufacturing activities – catering 
both to final consumers as well as other producers. One of the major characteristics of these units is 
that they are generally not registered under any set of institutional rules. As a result, they are outside 
the purview of the rules regarding urban land use and environmental regulation. Even if they are 
registered, their sheer numbers and small size have prompted authorities to bypass them while 
formulating such regulations. However, as with any other production process, they do cause 
substantial environmental damages in their small ways. These damages are not too obvious, as they do 
not have towering chimneys bellowing black smoke into the blue sky turning it grey. The total 
quantum of water, air, noise and soil pollution that they create add up to substantial level, because, 
what they lack in individual contribution, they more than make up by their sheer numbers. Moreover, 
formal sector firms, faced with regulatory prohibitions, maintain a backyard of subcontractors (Gupta, 
2002) and pass on a number of environmentally ‘dirty’ jobs to them, thereby escaping investment in 
Environmentally Sound Technology (EST). Also, a major part of the production process is ‘put out’ 
and shifted to urban slums to take advantage of the services of cheap labour available therein, 
including child labour. Most of these subcontractors, mainly informal sector units, lack Pollution 
Control Devices (PCDs), are devoid of basic sanitation and sewerage facilities, and therefore are more 
pollution intensive (Bartone & Benavides, 1993). It is also argued that workers and entrepreneurs in 
the UIS have little awareness of health and environmental impacts of pollution, and therefore have no 
incentive or ability to curb those (Kent, 1991). Historically, the towns and cities in developing 
countries have grown up sans plans and policies. Industries, tending to be located on the basis of 
proximity to raw materials, human resources, transport nodes, financial hubs and market, have 
concentrated in and around these urban centres. Gradually, because of space congestion and urban 
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sprawl, residential space and industrial space began to cohabit. This has effectively lead to 
deterioration in living conditions and substantial damage to the environment, thereby questioning the 
sustainability of many of these urban centres. Recently there has been wide concern over such issues, 
especially in urban areas, where environmental regulation is becoming a common practice. The 
reaction from the authorities has been to introduce both Market Based Instruments (MBI – like 
pollution permits, per unit pollution charges, etc.) and Regulatory Instruments (RI - like enforcing 
strict emission norms for vehicles and manufacturing units, fixing upper limits of noise-level, 
earmarking land use pattern etc.). On part of the State, improved sewerage disposal practices and 
streamlined traffic management systems have also been introduced. However, in a developing country 
like India, the design of policy instruments for industrial pollution is not only complex but also very 
daunting. In principle, the authorities have an array of physical, legal, monetary, and other instruments 
at their disposal (Baumol & Oates, 1988; Kathuria & Sterner, 2002), but the presence of a large 
number of informal manufacturing firms that lack knowledge, funds, technology and skills to treat 
their effluent frustrates any instrument applied and leads to overall failure. Regulators are also 
constrained by meagre resources to monitor, measure and impose pollution charges. Additionally, low 
remuneration rates invite corruption. These problems are compounded by information failures. The 
MBIs tend to fail under such circumstances because of sub-optimal pollution charges and emission 
norms. If the charges are low nobody will comply, especially the big firms. If the charges are raised 
beyond a point, many UIS firms may go out of business. This has prompted the authorities to go for 
rigid command-and-control policies where emission norms are fixed and the punishment of the guilty 
takes the form of either clampdown and outright closure, or shifting them to the peripheral regions, or 
forcing them to install PCDs, or a combination of these. However, the steps taken in reality has been 
mostly arbitrary and based on adhoc popular sentiment or political exigencies, rather than on sound 
economic and econometric analysis. Consequently, every time a ‘green’ policy has been initiated in 
any city in India there has been a uproar over the beneficial and detrimental effects of it with each 
party claiming to be to be the champion of the masses. In absence of rigorous cost benefit analysis 
decision making in the end has been erratic and knee-jerking. The regulations regarding relocation of 
industrial units from Delhi and tanneries from Kolkata, replacing diesel run commercial vehicles by 
CNG driven ones in Delhi, and the furore over imposition of vehicular emission norms in the cities 
and towns speak of this systematic haphazardness and messy politicking. It has been forgotten that 
each of the steps available to the authorities have different impacts on the individual firms and faced 
with these regulations, they behave differently. Moreover, it can not be denied that the UIS firms 
provide employment to a large number of people, supply cheap consumer products (mainly processed 
foods, ready-made garments and handicrafts) and services (transport, petty trading etc.) to the urban 
society, and produces goods and services which satisfy the special needs of the households at the 
lowest step of the income ladder. They also play an important role in recycling the wastes. 
Consequently, the informal sector has emerged as a vast sea of socially beneficial entrepreneurship 
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and innovativeness also. These positive gains have to be carefully weighed before delegating them to 
the fringes of human settlement or closing them down. Thus, the impact of environmentally 
regulatory policies on social welfare may be vastly different from what the authorities presume while 
imposing certain types of policies. In this paper, we try to model the reactions of the firms faced with 
a regulation regime and the consequent impact on both individual firms and the social welfare to 
arrive at certain parametric guidelines regarding appropriateness of various types of polices. 
The paper has eight sections. In the next section we outline the assumptions of the model. The formal 
model is deduced in the third section. In the fourth section possible outcomes of regulatory policies 
are analysed. The consequent impacts on social welfare and profit level of the firms are studied in the 
fifth section. A few conjectures are put forward in the sixth section while the seventh section indicates 
the actual outcomes under different parametric situations. The last section provides the conclusion and 
some policy implications. 
II. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL 
The environmental regime imposed on the UIS must recognise the fact that these firms 
usually operate outside the regulatory framework. They are not registered under any 
institutional body and, officially, they do not exist. As a result, imposing tax on them is not a 
realistic proposition. The authorities seem to recognise this and the regulation regime for the 
UIS generally asks them either to control emission or to shift out from the urban centre to 
some peripheral regions that are less congested and less inhabited. The State also carries out 
periodical surveys and raids, and units found to be polluting above permissible limits are shut 
down and penalised. We can model the situation in a simplistic way as follows. 
There is substantial number of informal manufacturing units within city limits. The objective 
of the State is to maximise Social Welfare (SW) and it is concerned not only about Pollution 
level (Z), but also about adequate Employment (L) and Output (Q). It has a threshold level of 
Z ( Z ), beyond which the firm is termed ‘Polluting’. A polluting firm, if found out, is 
penalised by imposing a fine F and confiscating all its products. They are also asked to either 
relocate, or pull down pollution levels below Z. Firms with Z lower than this threshold level 
Z are ignored by the State. 
The firms operate under Monopolistic competitive product market with differentiated but 
similar products facing perfectly competitive factor markets. Being small firms they can not 
upwardly revise prices but can cut prices by small margins in a bid to increase market share. 
However, such an action forces the competitors to follow suit and so there is an overall price-
decrease without any effect on individual shares, though total market size does increase. The 
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firms are thus price takers for all practical purpose. The objective of the firms is to maximise 
profit. 
The environmental damage (Z) caused by a firm depends on the amount of output (Q) it 
produces and the technology used, represented by the capital-labour ratio (k = K/L) of the 
firm. 
Imposition of environmental regulation does not affect firms with Z lower than threshold 
level but affects those with higher Z. These units can take any of the five alternate steps – 
Case - 1: Continue production as before and run the risk of detection and penalty; 
Case - 2: Shift to specified peripheral region; 
Case - 3: Scale down production to bring down Z below Z ; 
Case - 4: Upgrade technology to bring down Z below Z ; 
Case - 5: Shut down. 
The decision that a firm takes depends on its expected pay-off from the alternatives, which in 
turn depends on various parameters, as we shall shortly see. Thus, the impact on SW also 
depends on the decisions taken by the firms. In the following sections we try to model the 
possible outcomes and the impact on SW. 
III. FORMAL MODEL 
The situation can be depicted by the following set of equations. 
Social Welfare Function: 
0 ,0,   ),,(  ZQL fffZQLfSW     _______________________ (1) 
Pollution Function of the Sector: 
0g,0g,g   ),(   QQgZ     _______________________ (2) 
λ = Probability of being penalised, dependent on Effort by the State to impose environmental 
standards. 
Sectoral Pollution can also be seen as sum total of the Pollution level of individual firms and 
therefore – 

i
ijj zZ        _______________________ (3) 
zij  being the pollution level of the i
th
 firm at the j
th
 period, i = 1,2,…,N; j = 0,1, i.e. initial 
(pre-regulation) and final (post-regulation) period. 
Again, pollution level of the i
th
 firm depends on its output level and technology used. So, 
0 ,0 ),,(  kqijijij hhkqhz      _______________________ (4) 
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qij and kij are output and technological level of i
th
 firm at the j
th
 period, i = 1,2,…,N; j = 0,1, 
i.e. initial (pre-regulation) and final (post-regulation) period. It is assumed that a more 
environment friendly technology would be more capital intensive. 
The firms have fixed coefficient type production function and so – 
i
i
i
K
L
i
i
K
i
i
L k
L
K
a
a
K
q
a
L
q
a    ,  ,     _______________________ (5) 
Li and Ki are Labour and Capital respectively, used by the i
th
 firm. 
Therefore, 
Total Employment in j
th
 period = 
i
ijj LL   _______________________ (6) 
where, ),( ijijij kqlL        _______________________ (7) 
i.e. employment n the I
th
 firm depends on its output level and technology. 
Total Output in j
th
 period = 
i
ijj QQ    _______________________ (8) 
Costs incurred by the firms depend on their output and technology. So, assuming that Capital 
is more costly than Labour, we have 
0.c  ,0c ,),( kq  ijijij kqcC     _______________________ (9) 
The cost function for a given technology can be reformulated as 
2.. ijijij qcqbaC        ______________________ (10) 
where a = A(kij) 
Let initial Price situation be P. Therefore, Profit Function of the firms will be given by - 
),( ijijijij kqcqP  .     ______________________ (11) 
Initial profit maximising output is therefore obtained at the point where MR = MC, i.e. 
P = b + 2cqi0 
So, 
c
bP
qi
2
0

 .      ______________________ (12) 
This gives us the initial output level of the i
th
 firm. 
IV. POSSIBLE OUTCOMES 
Let us explore what happens after environmental regulation is imposed. This may take any of 
the alternate courses as already noted. We go through them one by one. 
Case 1: Firms continue production as before and run the risk of detection and penalty 
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The probability of detection, confiscation and penalty is λ. Hence the firm incurs all the costs 
but the probability of retaining that and selling in the market is (1 – λ). So expected revenue 
is P. (1 – λ), and expected profit of the ith firm will be 
FCPq ii   00 )1(      ______________________ (11) 
Since there is no change in MC, equilibrium output, employment, and pollution level of the 
i
th
 firm will not change, only their profit will be decreased. 
However, the state would be able to detect and shut down λ proportion of the firms. So there 
will be decline in total output by 0.. iqN . 
This will result in decline in employment by 
L
i
a
qN 0.. , 
and decline in pollution level by λZ. The state will additionally mop up resource of the 
magnitude λNF as penalties and can use that for environment clean-up drive, leading to an 
increase of SW by u(λNF). 
Therefore, the positive impact on SW will be 
L
i
LiQz
a
Nq
fNqfNFuZf 00 ..)(.

  . 
Case 2: Firms shift to specified peripheral region 
If polluting firms decide to shift to specified peripheral region, they have to bear two 
additional costs – a Fixed Cost related to Relocation (RC); and a Variable Cost related to 
transportation of commodities from city proper (TC per unit of output). 
Thus the profit of the firm now would be 
RCqTCkqcqP ijijijijij  .),(    ______________________ (12) 
As MC has changed, equilibrium output will also change. Profit maximising condition is 
given by P = b + 2cqi1 + TC; 
Hence, 
c
TC
c
bP
qi
22
1 

 .     ______________________ (13) 
Therefore, output per firm declines by 
c
TC
2
 units, and total decline in output would be 
c
TC
N
2
.  
units. 
Employment will decline by 
Lac
TC
N
1
.
2
. 





 units. 
Therefore, the impact on SW will be 
L
LQz
ac
TCN
f
c
TCN
fZf
1
2
.
2
.. 




 


 , 
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i.e. 








L
LQz
a
ff
c
TCN
Zf
1
.
2
.  
Case 3: Firms scale down production to bring down Z below Z  
The firms may decide to scale down output to bring down Z below Z . Decline in output 
required to come down to permissible limit would be 
qh
ZZ

 )(
. 
So total output declines by 
qh
ZZ
N

 )(
.  units; 
Employment declines by 
Lq ah
ZZ
N
.
)(
.


 units. 
Impact on SW will be 














Lq
L
q
Qz
ah
ZZN
f
h
ZZN
fZZf
.
)(
.
)(
.).( , 
i.e. 









L
LQ
q
z
a
ff
h
ZZN
ZZf
1
.
)(
).(  
Case 4: Firms install pollution control device to bring down Z below Z  
If the firms decide to install certain gadgets to control pollution, then they have to bear two 
additional costs – a Fixed Cost related to Installation (IC); and a variable Preventive Cost 
related to operational charges of the device (PC per unit of output). The results will be 
identical to Case-2, except that Z will not be completely eliminated but will come down to Z4, 
lower than Z . 
 
Thus the profit of the firm now would be 
ICqPCkqcqP ijijijijij  .),(    ______________________ (14) 
As MC has changed, equilibrium output will also change. Profit maximising condition is 
given by P = b + 2cqi1 + PC; 
Hence, 
c
PC
c
bP
qi
22
1 

 . 
Therefore, output per firm declines by 
c
PC
2
 units, and total decline in output would be 
c
PC
N
2
.  units. 
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Employment will decline by 
Lac
PC
N
1
.
2
. 





 units. 
Therefore, the impact on SW will be 
L
LQz
ac
PCN
f
c
PCN
fZZf
1
2
.
2
.).( 




 


 , 
i.e. 








L
LQz
a
ff
c
PCN
ZZf
1
.
2
).( 4  
Case 5: Firms shut down 
If the firms find that in each of the above cases they are facing losses, they would think of 
shutting down. In fact, if post regulation Average Revenue is less than post regulation 
Average Variable Cost, they will shut down. Let us first identify the conditions under which 
the firms will shut down. 
Case 1: 
Average Revenue = P(1 – λ) 
Average Variable Cost = b + cqi0. 
So the shut down condition is –  
P(1 – λ) < b + cqi0 
c
bP
cbPP
2
.

   
2
bP
bPP

   
P
bP
2

   
This condition can also be restated as 
P
b
22
1
 , i.e. whenever effort-
parameter of the State is beyond 0.5 (50 per cent effort), firms would shut 
down rather than continue production as before. 
Case 2: 
Average Revenue = P 
Average Variable Cost = b + cqi1 + TC. 
So the shut down condition is –  
P < b + cqi1 + TC 
TC
c
TC
c
c
bP
cbP 


2
.
2
.  
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22
bP
bP
TC 
  
bPTC   
Case 3: 
Average Revenue = P 
Average Variable Cost = b + cqi1. 
So the shut down condition is –  
P < b + cqi1 











q
i
h
ZZ
qcbP
)(
0  
0
)(
0 



q
i
h
ZZ
ccqbP  
0
)(
2






qh
ZZ
c
bP
 
qh
ZZ
c
bP





)(
2
, i.e. as long as required output reduction does not exceed 
initial output level, the firms are not intent to close down. 
Case 4: 
Average Revenue = P 
Average Variable Cost = b + cqi1 + PC. 
So the shut down condition is –  
P < b + cqi1 + PC 
PC
c
PC
c
c
bP
cbP 


2
.
2
.  
22
bP
bP
PC 
  
bPPC   
If all these cases are valid, i.e. none of the other alternatives offer a situation above Shut 
Down Point the firms will stop production. 
In that case the impact on SW will be 






L
LQiz
a
ffNqZf
1
.. 0 . 
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V. PROFIT AND SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER DIFFERENT SITUATIONS 
Assuming that shut down is the last option for the firms, they will try to choose such a step 
between alternatives 1 to 4 so that their expected Profit is highest. 
The Expected Profit Levels are as follows –  
Case 1:   FPqcqbqaFPq iiiii   002000 )1(  
where, )( 20000 iiii cqbqaqP  . 
Case 2: 1
2
111 .)( iiii qTCRCcqbqaPq   
c
TC
qTCRC
c
TCq
c
TC
c
c
TC
bcqbqa
c
TC
qP i
i
iii
2
.
2
.2
42
)(
2
2
0
0
2
2
2
000 


















RC
c
TC
c
TC
b
c
TC
Pi 






422
.
2
0  
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TC
bP
c
TC
i 






22
0  
Case 3: )( 2111 iii cqbqaPq   




































q
i
qq
ii
q
i
h
ZZ
q
h
ZZ
c
h
ZZ
bcqbqa
h
ZZ
qP 0
2
2
000 2)(  




































q
i
qqq
i
h
ZZ
q
h
ZZ
c
h
ZZ
b
h
ZZ
P 0
2
0 2.  
 
2
2
00
)(
)()(
2
qq
i
q
i
h
ZZc
h
ZZc
qbP
h
ZZ








  
 
2
2
0
)(
)()(
.
2
.2
qqq
i
h
ZZc
h
ZZc
c
bP
bP
h
ZZ








  
2
2
0
)(
)(
q
i
h
ZZc


  
Case 4: 1
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Case 5: One time Sale proceeds from selling of Fixed Assets. 
 
The corresponding impacts on SW are as follows –  
Case 1: 
L
i
LiQz
a
Nq
fNqfNFuZf 00 ..)(.

  . 
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Case 4: 








L
LQz
a
ff
c
PCN
ZZf
1
.
2
).( 4  
Case 5: 






L
LQiz
a
ffNqZf
1
.. 0 . 
This is like a 2-person - Non-zero sum - Pure strategy game, and stable equilibrium requires 
Nash equilibrium. The outcome would depend on the magnitude of the parameters λ, F, TC, 
RC, IC, PC, P, b, c, qh , Zf  , Qf  , Lf  , La , and Z . In the short to medium run, P, b, c, qh , and 
Z  are given by Market and Technological factors, and are non-manipulatable. Let us now 
make some conjectures regarding the possible outcomes under different situations. 
VI. FEW CONJECTURES 
If the state is very strict and efficient with λ = 1, Case 1 and Case 5 becomes almost identical 
in terms of effect on SW, with Case 1 having an additional benefit of resource mobilisation in 
the hands of the state. But with very high λ, firms would certainly not take Case 1 as that will 
lead to loss. In fact, with λ = 1, if the firms continue production as before, they would loose 
all the revenue and in addition will have to pay penalty F. So, λ = 1 precludes Case 1, and 
drives the firms to Case 5. In fact, any λ greater than 0.5 would force the firms to shut down 
rather than continue production as before. So they will move on to Case 2, Case 3, or Case 4 
depending on where their expected profitability is highest. The aim of the state therefore, 
would be to provide enough signals and adequate pressure so that the firms choose an option 
between Case 2 – Case 4, where both SW and Π are highest. 
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The alternates can be summarised in the following table –  
Case Profit Impact on Social Welfare 
II 
Relocation 
RC
TC
bP
c
TC
i 






22
0  








L
LQz
a
ff
c
TCN
Zf
1
.
2
.  
III 
Output 
Reduction 
2
2
0
)(
)(
q
i
h
ZZc


  









L
LQ
q
z
a
ff
h
ZZN
ZZf
1
.
)(
).(  
IV 
Installing 
PCDs 
IC
PC
bP
c
PC
i 






22
0  








L
LQz
a
ff
c
PCN
ZZf
1
.
2
).( 4  
 
It appears that the operative parameters are (TC, RC), 
qh
ZZ

 )(
, and (PC, IC). They have 
similar impacts on SW and Π – higher values of them reduce both SW and Π. 
Comparing Case 2 and Case 4 
1. With identical TC and PC, SW is higher in Case 2 when the units relocate. If RC < 
IC, firms will also find it more profitable to relocate. But if RC > IC, to provide 
incentive to relocate, the State should subsidise RC so that effective RC is less than IC 
as a lower RC compared to IC will provide higher profits to relocating firms. 
2. If TC < PC, the above result holds. 
3. If however, TC > PC, the firms will still relocate if 
RC
TC
bP
c
TC
i 






22
0  > IC
PC
bP
c
PC
i 






22
0  
IC
PC
bP
c
PC
RC
TC
bP
c
TC













2222
 
 
    RCICPCTC
c
PCTC
c
bP


 22
4
1
2
 
 
  RCICPCTC
cc
bP
PCTC 








4
1
2
)(  
 
 









PCTC
cc
bP
RCIC
PCTC
4
1
2
)(  
The denominator in the RHS is average post regulation output level of the relocated 
and PCD-installed firms. So the LHS multiplied by this denominator can be talen as 
some kind of difference between Total Transport Cost and Total Prevention Cost, 
using the average output as weights. In other words, if the gap between IC and RC is 
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greater that Total Transport Cost and Total Preventive Cost, firms will still relocate. 
However, in this case the impact on SW will not be unambiguously higher in Case 2. 
SW2 will be higher than SW4 only if -  

















L
LQz
L
LQz
a
ff
c
PCN
ZZf
a
ff
c
TCN
Zf
1
.
2
).(
1
.
2
. 4  
).(.
22
1
. iff,or 4ZZfZf
c
PCN
c
TCN
a
ff zz
L
LQ 




 








  
)(
1
. 
2
PC)-(TCiff,or 4Zf
a
ff
c
N
Z
L
LQ






  









L
LQ
Z
a
ff
c
N
Zf
1
. 
2
)(
PC)-(TCiff,or 4  
Thus, only if (TC – PC) is sufficiently small, that Case 2 will still be better for both 
social welfare and the firms. Otherwise, SW will be higher for Case 4, and even the 
firms may decide to install pollution control devices (PCDs) rather than relocate. If 
however, (TC – PC) is large enough to have greater social welfare in Case 4, but not 
large enough to induce firms to install PCDs, then the state should subsidise 
Installation of PCDs to bring down effective IC for the firms. 
 
Thus, whether the State chooses to press for Relocation or Installation of PCDs 
depends on the admissible limit of pollution (as Z4 has to be below Z ), and the 
society’s valuation of employment, output, and (diseconomies of) pollution, along 
with the relative costs of Relocation compared to Installation of PCDs, and also the 
relative costs of Transportation compared to Prevention. Without rigorous estimation 
and evaluation of these, any policy regulation would be arbitrary and sub-optimal for 
the society. 
Comparing Case 3 and Case 4 
We assume that Z4 is just equal to Z for simplicity’s sake. This is a realistic assumption as 
the firms install and run PCDs only up to that level where they barely reach below the 
maximum permissible pollution level. 
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1. If 
qh
ZZ

 )(
=
c
PC
2
, then impact on SW are identical for both the cases. The firms will 
choose Case 4 if 
2
2
0
)(
)(
q
i
h
ZZc


  < IC
PC
bP
c
PC
i 






22
0  
IC
PC
bP
c
PC
h
ZZc
q









22)(
)(
  iff,or 
2
2
 
c
PC
h
ZZ
IC
PC
bP
c
PC
c
PC
c
q 2)(
)(
 as      ,
22)2(
)(
.  iff,or 
2
2









  
IC
PC
bP
PC
c
PC













222
  iff,or  
 )(
2
  iff,or bPPC
c
PC
IC   





 

c
bP
c
PC
PCIC
22
  iff,or  
Now, 0
2
iq
c
bP


 = initial output, while 
c
PC
2
 is the drop in output due to installation 
of PCDs. Hence, 0
22
  i.e.  ,
22
0 



c
bP
-
c
PC
c
PC
q
c
bP
i . Therefore, the condition 
under which firms will choose Case 4 now becomes IC < 0, which is implausible. 
Thus as long as 
qh
ZZ

 )(
=
c
PC
2
, firms will chose Case 3, which has identical impact 
on SW. 
 
2. Again if 
qh
ZZ

 )(
 < 
c
PC
2
, SW is higher in Case 3. Now, firms will choose Case 4 if  
2
2
0
)(
)(
q
i
h
ZZc


  < IC
PC
bP
c
PC
i 






22
0  
IC
PC
bP
c
PC
h
ZZc
q









22)(
)(
  iff,or 
2
2
 
c
PC
h
ZZ
IC
PC
bP
c
PC
c
PC
c
q 2)(
)(
 as      ,
22)2(
)(
.  iff,or 
2
2









  
IC
PC
bP
PC
c
PC













222
  iff,or  
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 )(
2
  iff,or bPPC
c
PC
IC   





 

c
bP
c
PC
PCIC
22
  iff,or  
Now, 0
2
iq
c
bP


 = initial output, while 
c
PC
2
 is the drop in output due to installation 
of PCDs. Hence, 0
22
  i.e.  ,
22
0 



c
bP
-
c
PC
c
PC
q
c
bP
i . Therefore, the condition 
under which firms will choose Case 4 now becomes IC < 0, which is implausible. 
Thus as long as 
qh
ZZ

 )(
<
c
PC
2
, firms will choose Case 3, which has higher impact on 
SW. 
 
Thus in both these cases, the SW maximising step is also the best step for the firms, 
and they choose it, i.e. they reduce output. 
 
3. Again if 
qh
ZZ

 )(
 > 
c
PC
2
, SW is higher in Case 4. Now, firms will choose Case 4 if  
2
2
0
)(
)(
q
i
h
ZZc


  < IC
PC
bP
c
PC
i 






22
0  
IC
PC
bP
c
PC
h
ZZc
q









22)(
)(
  iff,or 
2
2
 
To ensure this, the State has to subsidise PC and IC so that firms do not reduce output 
but install PCDs instead. 
 
 
Thus, as long as 
qh
ZZ


 is less than or equal to 
c
PC
2
, the firms reduce output, and that is best 
for SW also, relative to installing PCDs. On the other hand, if the State is stricter and has a 
very low Z , installing PCDs emerges to be better than reducing output, and the State may 
provide incentive by subsidising IC and PC. 
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Comparing Case 2 and Case 3 
1. If 
qh
ZZ

 )(
=
c
TC
2
, then impact on SW is higher in Case 2. 
The firms will choose Case 2 if 
2
2
0
)(
)(
q
i
h
ZZc


  < RC
TC
bP
c
TC
i 






22
0  
RC
TC
bP
c
TC
h
ZZc
q









22)(
)(
  iff,or 
2
2
 
c
TC
h
ZZ
RC
TC
bP
c
TC
c
TC
c
q 2)(
)(
 as      ,
22)2(
)(
.  iff,or 
2
2









  
RC
TC
bP
TC
c
TC













222
  iff,or  
 )(
2
  iff,or bPTC
c
TC
RC   





 

c
bP
c
TC
TCRC
22
  iff,or  
Now, 0
2
iq
c
bP


 = initial output, while 
c
TC
2
 is the drop in output due to installation 
of PCDs. Hence, 0
22
  i.e.  ,
22
0 



c
bP
-
c
TC
c
TC
q
c
bP
i . Therefore, the condition 
under which firms will choose Case 2 now becomes RC < 0, which is implausible. 
Thus as long as 
qh
ZZ

 )(
=
c
TC
2
, firms will chose Case 3, while optimum for SW 
would have been Case 2. 
 
2. Again if 
qh
ZZ

 )(
 < 
c
TC
2
, SW is higher in Case 3. Now, firms will choose Case 2 if  
2
2
0
)(
)(
q
i
h
ZZc


  < RC
TC
bP
c
TC
i 






22
0  
RC
TC
bP
c
TC
h
ZZc
q









22)(
)(
  iff,or 
2
2
 
c
TC
h
ZZ
RC
TC
bP
c
TC
c
TC
c
q 2)(
)(
 as      ,
22)2(
)(
.  iff,or 
2
2









  
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RC
TC
bP
TC
c
TC













222
  iff,or  
 )(
2
  iff,or bPTC
c
TC
RC   





 

c
bP
c
TC
TCRC
22
  iff,or  
Now, 0
2
iq
c
bP


 = initial output, while 
c
TC
2
 is the drop in output due to installation 
of PCDs. Hence, 0
22
  i.e.  ,
22
0 



c
bP
-
c
TC
c
TC
q
c
bP
i . Therefore, the condition 
under which firms will choose Case 2 now becomes RC < 0, which is implausible. 
Thus as long as 
qh
ZZ

 )(
<
c
TC
2
, firms will choose Case 3, which also has higher 
impact on SW. 
 
3. Now if 
qh
ZZ

 )(
 > 
c
TC
2
, SW is higher in Case 2. Firms will also choose Case 2 if  
2
2
0
)(
)(
q
i
h
ZZc


  < RC
TC
bP
c
TC
i 






22
0  
RC
TC
bP
c
TC
h
ZZc
q









22)(
)(
  iff,or 
2
2
 
To ensure this, the State has to subsidise TC and RC so that firms do not reduce 
output but relocate instead. 
 
Thus, as long as 
qh
ZZ


 is less than 
c
TC
2
, the firms reduce output, and that is best for SW 
also, relative to relocating themselves. However, if  
qh
ZZ


 is equal to 
c
TC
2
, the firms reduce 
output, whereas the optimum would have been relocation. On the other hand, if the State is 
stricter and has a very low Z , relocating emerges to be better than reducing output, and the 
State may provide incentive by subsidising RC and TC. 
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VII. ACTUAL OUTCOME 
The actual outcome would thus depend on the relative magnitudes of 
c
TC
2
, 
c
PC
2
, and 
qh
ZZ


. 
1. If  
c
TC
2
 = 
c
PC
2
 = 
qh
ZZ


 
SW is highest in Case 2, i.e. when the firms relocate themselves to peripheral regions. 
But firms will choose Case 2 only if RC < IC and RC < 0. The second condition being 
implausible, they move to Case 3, and reduce output. Only if the State provides 
positive incentive for relocation so that effective RC is less than zero that the SW 
maximising outcome will also be Profit maximising outcome and the firms will take 
it. If the State values SW highly, it will provide such incentives. Otherwise, a SW 
sub-optimal step of reduced output, employment and pollution will emerge. 
2. If  
c
TC
2
 < 
qh
ZZ


= 
c
PC
2
  
In this situation also, SW is highest in Case 2, i.e. when the firms relocate themselves 
to peripheral regions. The firms will relocate if RC
TC
bP
c
TC
h
ZZc
q









22)(
)(
2
2
. 
This may be facilitated by subsidising RC and TC. Thus, SW Maximising and Profit 
maximising outcomes will be identical if subsidised Relocation and Transport Costs 
are introduced, and the firms will relocate themselves. 
3. If 
c
PC
2
 < 
c
TC
2
 = 
qh
ZZ


 
The outcome will depend on the relative differences between RC and IC, compared to 
TC and PC. Also, if (TC – PC) is large enough to have greater social welfare in Case 
4, and as 
c
PC
2
 < 
qh
ZZ


, the State may actually choose to subsidise installation and 
operation of PCDs. 
4. If  
qh
ZZ


 < 
c
TC
2
 = 
c
PC
2
  
In this situation, SW is maximised in Case 3, and for the firms, profit maximisation is 
ensured at this option too. Hence, output reduction takes place. The State may avoid this by 
lowering Z  further down, so that relocating emerges to be better than reducing output, and 
the State may provide incentive by subsidising RC and TC. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The results may be summarised in terms of the following table – 
Parameter 
Constraints 
Social Welfare 
Maximises at 
Profit of Firms 
Maximises at 
Steps to ensure 
Optimality 
c
TC
2
 = 
c
PC
2
 = 
qh
ZZ


 
Relocation of Firms to 
peripheral regions 
(Case 2) 
Reduction of Output 
(Case 3) 
Provide firms with 
cash incentive to 
relocate 
c
TC
2
 < 
qh
ZZ


= 
c
PC
2
 
Relocation of Firms to 
peripheral regions 
(Case 2) 
Reduction of Output 
(Case 3) or 
Relocation (Case 2) 
Subsidise Relocation 
and Transportation 
Costs 
c
PC
2
 < 
c
TC
2
 = 
qh
ZZ


 
Installing PCDs (Case 
4) or Relocation of 
Firms to peripheral 
regions (Case 2) 
Installing PCDs 
(Case 4) or 
Reduction of Output 
(Case 3) 
Subsidise Installation 
and Operation Costs 
of Pollution Control 
Devices 
qh
ZZ


 < 
c
TC
2
 = 
c
PC
2
 
Reduction of Output 
(Case 3) 
Reduction of Output 
(Case 3) 
Optimality is 
ensured. But the state 
may avoid this by 
imposing stricter 
regime with lower 
Z , so that Relocation 
is ensured. 
 
The above schema therefore reveals that whenever the State chooses to impose 
Environmental Standards to reduce pollution created by Urban Informal Manufacturing units, 
the firms may react in a host of alternate ways. The final outcome will depend on an Action-
Reaction pattern based on Signals, Pressures, and Policy Announcements that will determine 
the magnitude of the determining parameters. The impact on Social Welfare will also depend 
on the prevailing values of these parameters. 
 
The single most significant policy conclusion that one may arrive from the above analysis is 
that the likely impact on Social Welfare depends both on the steps taken to reduce pollution 
(e.g. imposing penalties, relocating firms, reducing output, and installing pollution control 
devices) and on the magnitude of the associated parameters. In fact, the optimum step 
depends on the values of these parameters and hence the State should not decide a-priori on 
adopting a particular solution for reducing pollution. Only proper estimation of the values of 
the different parameters would reveal the Social Welfare maximising option, and whether the 
firms may be persuaded to follow that option too. Policy regulations should therefore follow 
empirical stocktaking and not be based on normative generalisation. 
___________________________ 
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